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Abstract—Sharing resource blocks in NOMA systems provides
more opportunity to the internal users to overhear the messages
of the other users. Therefore, some sort of secrecy against the
internal users in addition to the external eavesdroppers must be
provided. In this paper, we investigate the secrecy performance
of a two-user NOMA system in existence of the external and
internal passive eavesdroppers, where the far user acts as an
internal eavesdropper and tries to overhear the message of the
near user. Our system consists of a single antenna base station,
two legitimate users and an external passive eavesdropper. We
present the closed-forms for the ergodic secrecy rates of the users.
Moreover, to derive the secrecy outage probability (SOP) of the
system, we use Gaussian-Chebyshev quadrature method, which
gives an approximation for the SOP. Numerical results show that
this approximation is very close to the exact value of the SOP of
the system. Finally, we eliminate the external eavesdropper and
present the closed-forms for the ergodic rate of the far user, the
ergodic secrecy rate of the near user and also the SOP of the
system.
Index Terms—Secure NOMA, Physical layer security, Un-
trusted users.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) serves mul-
tiple users at the same time and frequency resources, us-
ing NOMA in fifth-generation (5G) networks enhances the
spectral efficiency. NOMA uses superposition at the base
station (BS) and successive interference cancelation (SIC) at
the strong users [1]. The outage probability (OP) of a randomly
deployed users NOMA is studied in [2], which is shown that
NOMA enhances the outage performance of the system in
comparison with orthogonal multiple access systems. There
exist many works that investigate the OP of the different types
of NOMA systems such as cooperative NOMA in [3], relay
assisted NOMA in [4], [5] and NOMA with energy harvesting
in [6], [7]. Another system performance metric is the ergodic
sum-rate, which is shown to be enhanced in a NOMA system
in [2]. The ergodic rates of the users in different NOMA
scenarios have been also studied in [8], [9].
As the messages are sent in the open medium to all users
in wireless networks, the secrecy of the messages of the users
must be provided against the internal and external eavesdrop-
pers. Utilizing the physical layer capabilities of wireless net-
works is a promising way to enhance the secrecy performance
of the system. Secrecy outage probability (SOP) of a NOMA
system with the external eavesdroppers is studied in [10], [11].
SOP of the other various NOMA systems in existence of
the external eavesdroppers have been investigated in different
scenarios such as secure cooperative NOMA systems in [12]–
[14] and relay assisted NOMA networks in [15], [16]. The
ergodic secrecy rate of the users in NOMA systems with the
external eavesdropper is also investigated in [17]–[19].
As users that share the same resource blocks in NOMA
systems may not trust each other, at least some level of
secrecy must be provided against the internal users. In power
domain NOMA systems, the near users first carry out the
SIC and decode the messages of the far users, then they
decode their own messages. Therefore, they are aware of the
messages of the far users, which means following the NOMA
protocol forces the far users to trust the near users. But in
some scenarios, it is necessary to maintain the secrecy at
the near users against the far users. First in [20], the secrecy
performance of a NOMA system with an internal eavesdropper
is investigated, in which the SOP of the near user and the OP
of the system are derived.
In this paper, we study the effects of the existence of both
external and internal passive eavesdroppers on the secrecy
performance of a NOMA system. We consider a system
consisting of a single antenna base station, two legitimate
users and an external passive eavesdropper. The users are
called the near and far users according to their distances to
the base station. The external eavesdropper is interested in
overhearing the messages of both users. The far user trusts
the near user in order to follow the power domain NOMA
protocol, while it is interested in overhearing the message
of the near user. We derive the ergodic secrecy rate of the
users and the SOP of the system in a closed form. Finally, by
ignoring the existence of the external eavesdropper, we reduce
our system to the one in [20] and derive the ergodic secrecy
rate of the near user and also the ergodic rate of the far user,
not studied in [20]. Moreover, we provide the closed-form
SOP of both users. Compared to the results of [20], which
is the SOP of the near user and OP of both users, deriving
the SOP of both users is more complex due to the correlation
between the channel coefficients. In presence of the external
eavesdropper, we use Gaussian-Chebyshev quadrature method
to present an approximation for the SOP. Our simulations
confirm the accuracy of this approximation.
Notation: In this paper, we denote the cumulative distribution
function and probability density function of a random variable
X as FX (x) and fX (x), respectively. A shows the comple-
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Fig. 1. System model with external eavesdropper.
mentary event of event A and Ei (.) is the exponential integral,
where Ei (x) = −
∞∫
x
e−t
t
dt. Moreover, U(.) is the unit step
function.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Our system consists of a single antenna BS, an external
passive eavesdropper, Ue, and two legitimate users, Um and
Un, while it is assumed that Um is nearer than Un to the BS.
The channel between Ue, Um and Un and BS are rayleigh fad-
ing channels with coefficients as ge, gm and gn, respectively.
The |ge|2,|gm|2 and |gn|2 are exponentially random variables
distributed with parameter λ. Also, de, dm and dn are the
distances between Ue, Um and Un to the BS, respectively.
Secrecy at both users are guaranteed against the Ue and also
secrecy at the near user is provided against the Un.
As depicted in Fig. 1, BS with power PBS , transmits a
superposition of the messages of both users, called Sm and Sn.
The allocated power coefficients to Um and Un are denoted
as am and an, respectively. So the transmitted signal of the
BS is as:
XBS = (amSm + anSn)
√
PBS . (1)
By following the NOMA protocol, we allocate more power to
the far user, and thus a2n ≥ a2m. At the receivers, Um and Un
observe the signals as:
Yi =
gi (amSm + anSn)
√
PBS
d
α
2
i
+Ni, (2)
where i ∈ {Um, Un}, the path-loss is denoted as α and Ni
is a zero mean additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) with
variance one. Um decodes Sn by Ym and then by subtracting
it from Ym observes a signal as:
Yˆm =
gmam
√
PBS
d
α
2
m
Sm +Nm. (3)
Simultaneously, Un decodes Sn from Yn, while it considers
Sm as noise. The received signal at the external eavesdropper
is as:
Ye =
ge (amSm + anSn)
√
PBS
d
α
2
e
+Ne, (4)
where Ne is the zero mean AWGN with variance one.
Ue first decodes Sn from Ye and then decodes Sm from
Yˆe =
geam
√
PBS
d
α
2
e
Sm +Ne.
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Fig. 2. System model without external eavesdropper.
A. No external eavesdropper
As illustrated in Fig. 2, by ignoring the external eavesdrop-
per and assuming |ge|2 = 0, the far user overhears the message
of the near user in a system as [20]. The transmitted signal
of the BS is as (1) and the received signals of the near and
far users are as (2). We note that in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2, Sˆi, S˘i
and S˙i are denoting the decoded messages at Um, Un and Ue,
respectively, where i ∈ {m,n}.
III. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY
The secrecy of the message of the far user must be pro-
vided against the Ue and also the secrecy of the message
of the near user must be maintained against the Ue and
Un. We assume |g˜i|2 = |gi|
2
dαi
, in which i ∈ {m,n, e} and
F|g˜i|2 (x) =
(
1− e−λdαi x). By defining Rm and Rn as the
targeted data rates of Um and Un, the SOP event occurs if
either Um is not able to decode Sn, i.e. ,
E1 =
{
(1+
|g˜m|
2a2n
|g˜m|2a2m +
1
PBS
)− log(1+
|g˜e|
2a2n
|g˜e|2a2m +
1
PBS
) < Rn
}
,
(5)
or Um is not able to decode Sm, i.e. ,
E2 =
{
{log(1 + |g˜m|
2
a
2
mPBS)− log(1 + |g˜n|
2
a
2
mPBS) < Rm}
∪ {log(1 + |g˜m|
2
a
2
mPBS)− log(1 + |g˜e|
2
a
2
mPBS) < Rm}
}
,
(6)
or Un is not able to decode its own message, i.e. ,
E3 =
{
log(1 +
|g˜n|2a2n
|g˜n|2a2m +
1
PBS
)− log(1 +
|g˜e|2a2n
|g˜e|2a2m +
1
PBS
) < Rn
}
.
(7)
Therefore, the SOP event is defined as:
SOP = 1− Pr (E1 ∩ E2 ∩ E3) . (8)
According to (6) and (7), in order to avoid occurring secrecy
outage, if we have 1 + |g˜m|2a2mPBS ≥ 1 + |g˜n|2a2mPBS and
1+
|g˜n|2a2n
|g˜n|2a2m+ 1PBS
≥ 2Rn(1+ |g˜e|2a2n|g˜e|2a2m+ 1PBS
)
, then we are sure
that 1+
|g˜m|2a2n
|g˜m|2a2m+ 1PBS
≥ 2Rn(1+ |g˜e|2a2n|g˜e|2a2m+ 1PBS
)
, which means:
E1 ⊆ E2 ∩ E3. (9)
Here, we rewrite the SOP as the summation of the probabilities
of two distinct events as:
SOP = 1− (r3 + r4) , (10)
where r3 and r4 are defined at the bottom of this page in
(11) and (12), respectively. According to (12), |g˜n|2 < |g˜e|2
and 1 +
|g˜n|2a2n
|g˜n|2a2m+ 1PBS
≥ 2Rn
(
1 +
|g˜e|2a2n
|g˜e|2a2m+ 1PBS
)
, therefore
r4 = 0 and thus SOP = 1 − r3. The last step for deriving
the SOP is calculating r3. By defining C1 = 2
Rn − 1,
X =
|g˜e|2a2n
|g˜e|2a2m+ 1PBS
and δ1 =
1−2Rna2m
2Rna2m
, we have:
r3 = Pr
{{1 + |g˜m|2a2mPBS ≥ 2Rm (1 + |g˜n|2a2mPBS)}
∩ {|g˜n|2 ≥ C1 + 2
RnX
PBS (a2n − C1a2m − 2Rna2mX)
} ∩ {X ≤ δ1}
}
.
(13)
By following (13), we know that X and δ1 are greater than
zero, therefore a2m must be lower than
1
2Rn
, otherwise r3 = 0
and SOP of the system becomes one. Now we rewrite (13) as:
r3 =
δ1∫
0
fX (x)
∞∫
C1+2
Rnx
PBS(a2n−C1a2m−2
Rna2mx)
f|g˜n|2 (y)×
∞∫
2Rm (1+a2mPBSy)−1
a2mPBS
f|g˜m|2 (z) dzdydx.
(14)
First we derive FX (x) in order to calculate r3. So we have:
FX (x) = Pr
{
|g˜e|2a2n
|g˜e|2a2m + 1PBS
≤ x
}
= U
(
x− a
2
n
a2m
)
+
F|g˜e|2
(
x
PBS (a2n − a2mx)
)
U
(
−x+ a
2
n
a2m
)
= U
(
x− a
2
n
a2m
)
+
(
1− e−λd
α
e
x
PBS(a2n−a2mx)
)
U
(
−x+ a
2
n
a2m
)
.
(15)
By taking derivative of (15), fX (x) is obtained as:
fX (x) =
λdαe
PBS
a2n
(a2n − a2mx)2
e
−λdαe xPBS(a2n−a2mx)×
U
(
−x+ a
2
n
a2m
)
.
(16)
By substituting (16) into (14) and after some mathematical
calculations, r3 is obtained as:
r3 =
λ (dedn)
α
PBS (dαn + 2
Rmdαm)
e
−λ
(2Rm−1)dαm
a2mPBS ×
δm∫
0
a2n
(a2n − a
2
mx)
2
e
−λ
(
dαe
x
PBS(a2n−a2mx)
+
(C1+2Rnx)(dαn+2Rmdαm)
PBS(a2n−C1a2m−2Rna2mx)
)
dx
=
λ (dedn)
α
PBS (dαn + 2
Rmdαm)
e
−λ
(2Rm−1)dαm
a2mPBS × I,
(17)
where δm = min
(
a2n
a2m
, δ1
)
. We use Gaussian-Chebyshev
quadrature method to approximate I as:
I ≈
N∑
i=1
ωie
−λci , (18)
where ci =
dαe (1+θi)
δm
2
PBS
(
a2n−a
2
m
δm
2
(1+θi)
)+
(
C1+2
Rn δm
2
(1+θi)
)(
dαn+2
Rmdαm
)
PBS
(
a2n−C1a
2
m−2
Rna2m
δm
2
(1+θi)
) ,
ωi =
piδm
2N
a2n
√
1−θ2i
(a2n−a2m δm2 (1+θi))
2 , θi = cos
(
2i−1
2N pi
)
and N is the
complexity-vs-accuracy coefficient. Finally by substituting
(18) into (17) the SOP of the system is obtained as:
SOP ≈ 1− λ (dedn)
α
PBS (dαn + 2
Rmdαm)
e
−λ(
2Rm−1)dαm
a2mPBS
N∑
i=1
ωie
−λci .
(19)
A. No external eavesdropper
By assuming |ge|2 = 0, we reduce our system to a system
in [20]. We consider a more general definition on the SOP,
which includes the secrecy outage probability of Um and total
outage probability of the system, considered in [20].
The SOP of the system is as (8), where due to
the eliminating the eavesdropper, the event that Um is
not able to decode Sn and also the event that Un
is not able to decode its own message are changed
to E1 =
{
log
(
1 +
|g˜m|2a2n
|g˜m|2a2m+ 1PBS
)
< Rn
}
and E3 ={
log
(
1 +
|g˜n|2a2n
|g˜n|2a2m+ 1PBS
)
< Rn
}
, respectively. By following
the same approach as (9), the SOP of the system is written as:
SOP = Pr (E2 ∩ E3) . (20)
By defining τn =
C1
PBS(a2n−C1a2m) , after some mathematical
calculations, SOP of the system becomes one under the
condition
a2n
a2m
≤ C1, otherwise the SOP of the system equals
to:
SOP = 1− P1, (21)
r3 = Pr
{{
1 + |g˜m|
2
a
2
mPBS ≥ 2
Rm
(
1 + |g˜n|
2
a
2
mPBS
)}⋂{
|g˜n|
2 ≥ |g˜e|
2
}⋂{
1 +
|g˜n|
2a2n
|g˜n|2a2m +
1
PBS
≥ 2Rn
(
1 +
|g˜e|
2a2n
|g˜e|2a2m +
1
PBS
)}}
.
(11)
r4 = Pr
{{
1 + |g˜m|
2
a
2
mPBS ≥ 2
Rn
(
1 + |g˜e|
2
a
2
mPBS
)}⋂
{|g˜n|
2
< |g˜e|
2}
⋂{
1 +
|g˜n|
2a2n
|g˜n|2a2m +
1
PBS
≥ 2Rn
(
1 +
|g˜e|
2a2n
|g˜e|2a2m +
1
PBS
)}}
.
(12)
where P1 = Pr
{{|g˜n|2 ≥ τn} ∩ {1 + |g˜m|2a2mPBS ≥
2Rm
(
1 + |g˜n|2a2mPBS
)}}, and is equal to:
P1 =
∞∫
τn
f|g˜n|2 (x)
∞∫
2Rm (1+a2mPBSx)−1
a2mPBS
f|g˜m|2 (y) dydx. (22)
By applying f|g˜i|2(x) = λd
α
i e
−λdαi x (i ∈ {m,n, e}) into (22),
P1 is obtained as:
P1 =
dαn
dn + 2Rmdαm
e
−λ
(
dαm(2Rm−1)
a2mPBS
+τn(dαn+2
Rmdαm)
)
. (23)
Therefore, from (21) and (23), the SOP of the system equals
to:
SOP = 1− d
α
n
dn + 2Rmdαm
e
−λ
(
dαm(2Rm−1)
a2mPBS
+τn(dαn+2Rmdαm)
)
.
(24)IV. ERGODIC SECRECY RATE
In this section, we study the ergodic secrecy rates of the
users. First we derive the achievable rate of each user without
secrecy constraints and then we subtract the leakage rate from
its achievable rate to obtain secure achievable rate, as:
Rseci = R
a
i −RLi , (25)
where Rai and R
L
i are the achievable and leakage rates of the
user i, i ∈ {Um, Un}. Finally, the expected value of Rseci
presents the ergodic secrecy rate of the user i, as:
E(Rseci ) = E(R
a
i )− E(RLi ). (26)
Since the message of Um is overheard by Un and Ue, so
the rate of the leakage information of Um is as:
RLm = max
(
1 + |g˜n|2a2mPBS , 1 + |g˜e|2a2mPBS
)
= 1 + a2mPBS max
(|g˜n|2 , |g˜e|2) . (27)
Now, we find Fmax(|g˜n|2 , |g˜e|2) (x) in order to derive the
expected value of (27) as:
Fmax(|g˜n|2 , |g˜e|2) (x) = Pr
{|g˜n|2 < x ∩ |g˜e|2 < x}
=
(
1− e−λdαnx
)(
1− e−λdαe x
)
.
(28)
By taking derivative of (28), fmax(|g˜n|2 , |g˜e|2) (x) equals to:
fmax(|g˜n|2 , |g˜e|2) (x) =
λ
(
dαne
−λdαnx + dαe e
−λdαe x − (dαn + dαe ) e−λ(d
α
n+d
α
e )x
)
.
(29)
Now E(RLm) is obtained as:
E(RLm) = E
{
1 + a2mPBS max
(
|g˜n|
2
, |g˜e|
2)} =
(log2 e)
∞∫
0
ln
(
1 + a2mPBSx
)
f
max(|g˜n|2 , |g˜e|2) (x) dx =
− (log2 e)
(
e
λdαn
a2mPBS Ei
(
−
λdαn
a2mPBS
)
+
e
λdαe
a2mPBS Ei
(
−
λdαe
a2mPBS
)
− e
λ(dαn+d
α
e )
α
a2mPBS Ei
(
−
λ (dαn + d
α
e )
α
a2mPBS
))
.
(30)
The achievable rate of Um is as:
Ram = log
(
1 + |g˜m|2a2mPBS
)
. (31)
By following the approach of equations (27) and (28) in [19],
and after some mathematical calculations, the expected value
of achievable rate of Um equals to:
E(Ram) = − log2 (e) e
λdαm
a2mPBS Ei
(
− λd
α
m
a2mPBS
)
. (32)
Finally, by substituting (30) and (32) into (26), the ergodic
secrecy rate of Um is obtained as:
E(Rsecm ) = − (log2 e)
(
e
λdαm
a2mPBS Ei
(
− λd
α
m
a2mPBS
)
−
e
λdαn
a2mPBS Ei
(
− λd
α
n
a2mPBS
)
− e
λdαe
a2mPBS Ei
(
− λd
α
e
a2mPBS
)
+e
λ(dαn+d
α
e )
α
a2mPBS Ei
(
−λ (d
α
n + d
α
e )
α
a2mPBS
))
.
(33)
The leakage rate of Un is:
RLn = log
(
1 +
|g˜e|2a2nPBS
|g˜e|2a2nPBS + 1
)
. (34)
Therefore by following the approach of [19], the expected
value of the leakage rate of the far user is obtained as:
E(RLn ) = E
{
log
(
1 + PBS |g˜e|2
)− log (1 + a2mPBS |g˜e|2)} =
− (log2 e)
(
e
λdαe
PBS Ei
(
− λd
α
e
PBS
)
− e
λdαe
a2mPBS Ei
(
− λd
α
e
a2mPBS
))
.
(35)
The achievable rate of Un is the minimum of the achievable
rate of the near user for performing SIC and the achievable
rate of the far user in order to decode its own message, which
means:
Ran = min
(
log
(
1 +
|g˜m|2a2m
|g˜m|2a2m + 1PBS
)
,
log
(
1 +
|g˜n|2a2n
|g˜n|2a2m + 1PBS
))
.
(36)
The ergodic rate of Un is the expected value of R
a
n, which is
shown in the following:
E(Ran) = E
{
log
(
min
(|g˜m|2, |g˜n|2)PBS + 1)−
log
(
min
(|g˜m|2, |g˜n|2) a2mPBS + 1)} . (37)
In order to calculate (37), we derive Fmin(|g˜m|2,|g˜n|2) (x). So
we have:
Fmin(|g˜m|2,|g˜n|2) (x) = Pr
{
min
(|g˜m|2, |g˜n|2) ≤ x}
(a)
= 1− e−λdx,
(38)
where (a) holds due to the independence of the channel
coefficients and also we define d as d = dαm + d
α
n . So by
taking derivative we have:
fmin(|g˜m|2,|g˜n|2) (x) = λde
−λdx. (39)
TABLE I
SIMULATIONS PARAMETERS
Number of iterations 105
Distance of Um to BS dm = 4m
Distance of Un to BS dn = 6m
Distance of Ue to BS de = 7m
Parameter of the channels λ = 1
Path-loss exponent α = 4
Users’ targeted data rates (Fig. 3 and Fig. 4) Rn = Rm = 0.1
Power allocation coefficients (Fig. 3 and Fig. 5) a2n = 0.6, a
2
m = 0.4
The complexity-vs-accuracy coefficient N = 200
Transmitted power of BS (Fig. 4. and Fig. 6.) PBS = 30dB
After applying (37) and (39) and some mathematical calcula-
tions and following the approach of [19], the ergodic rate of
Un is derived as:
E(Ran) = −
(
log2 e
)×
(
e
λd
PBS Ei
(− λd
PBS
)− e λda2mPBS Ei(− λd
a2mPBS
))
.
(40)
Now by substituting (37) and (40) into (26), the ergodic
secrecy rate of Un is obtained as:
E(Rsecn ) = − (log2 e)
((
e
λd
PBS Ei
(
− λd
PBS
)
−
e
λd
a2mPBS Ei
(
− λd
a2mPBS
))
− e
λdαe
PBS Ei
(
− λd
α
e
PBS
)
+
e
λdαe
a2mPBS Ei
(
− λd
α
e
a2mPBS
))
.
(41)
A. No external eavesdropper
In this subsection, the existence of the eavesdropper is
ignored by assuming |ge|2 = 0. The ergodic rate of the
far user and the ergodic secrecy rate of the near user are
provided, while the far user acts as an internal eavesdropper.
The ergodic rate of Un equals to E(R
a
n), which is derived
in (40). Moreover, by following the same way as (32),
the expected value of the leakage rate of Um equals to
−(log2 e)e
λdαn
a2mPBS Ei(− λdαn
a2mPBS
). Therefore, by using (32), the
ergodic secrecy rate of Um is:
E(Rsecm ) = −
(
log2 e
)×(
e
λdαm
a2mPBS Ei
(− λdαm
a2mPBS
)− e λdαna2mPBS Ei(− λdαn
a2mPBS
))
.
(42)
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present the numerical results for two
cases of the secrecy outage probability and ergodic secrecy
rates of the users. Parameters of our simulations are presented
in Table I. Monte-Carlo simulations are utilized by generating
random fading channel coefficients for the users and the
external eavesdropper.
A. Secrecy outage probability
Fig. 3 shows the SOP of the NOMA system with and with-
out the Ue. As illustrated, the analytical results are confirmed
by the simulation results. Without Ue at low SNR regimes,
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Fig. 3. SOP of the system versus PBS .
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increasing PBS decreases the SOP of the system. While at
high SNR regimes, increasing the transmitted power of the
base station has no effects on the SOP of the system, because
the SOP only depends on the channel coefficients. In existence
of the Ue, increasing the transmitted power of the base station
at low SNR regimes decreases the SOP of the system. But at
high SNR regimes due to the increment of the ability of the
Ue in order to decode the messages of Um and Un, increasing
PBS increases the SOP of the system.
Fig. 4 shows the SOP of the systems with and without Ue
with respect to a2m (power allocation coefficient of NOMA).
As mentioned, following the NOMA protocol forces us to
allocate more power to the far user, which means a2m ≤ 0.5.
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Fig. 6. Ergodic rate/ secrecy rate of the users versus a2m.
In both cases, we see that by increasing a2m up to 0.25, SOP
of the system decreases. But according to the increment of the
ability of the eavesdroppers in order to decode the messages
of the users and also decrement of the ability of Un in order
to decode its own message, increasing a2m from 0.25 to 0.5
decreases the SOP of the system. Moreover, existence of Ue
degrades the secrecy outage performance of the system.
B. Ergodic secrecy rate
Fig. 5 demonstrates the ergodic rate and ergodic secrecy
rate of the users with respect to the transmitted power of the
base station with and without Ue. We see that without Ue, at
low SNR regimes, increasing PBS increases the ergodic rate
of Un. At high SNR regimes, i.e. , PBS →∞, the ergodic rate
of Un goes to log
(
1 +
a2n
a2m
)
= log (2.5) = 1.3219, which is
confirmed by our simulations. Moreover with Ue, increasing
PBS increases the ergodic secrecy rate of Un at low SNR
regimes. Since the ergodic rates of Ue and Un goes to 1.3219
at high SNR regimes, for the value of PBS higher than 40dB,
increasing the transmitted power of the base station decreases
the ergodic secrecy rate of Un until it goes to zero. Besides,
with and without Ue, at low SNR regimes, increasing PBS
increases the ergodic secrecy rate of Um. At high SNR regimes
increasing PBS has no effect on the ergodic secrecy rate of
Um, because at high SNR regimes the ergodic secrecy rate
of Um only depends on |g˜m|2, |g˜n|2 and |g˜e|2. Moreover, it
is shown that existence of the external eavesdropper degrades
the ergodic secrecy rate of Um.
Fig. 6 illustrates the ergodic rate and ergodic secrecy rate
of Un and Um versus a
2
m with and without Ue. It is shown
that increasing a2m decreases the ergodic secrecy rate of Um
and decreases the ergodic rate/ ergodic secrecy rate of Un due
to increment of the allocated power of Um and decrement of
the allocated power of Un.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the secrecy performance of a
NOMA system, while the far user acts as an internal eaves-
dropper with and without the external eavesdropper. We pre-
sented the closed-forms for the secrecy outage probability and
ergodic secrecy rate of the users. Investigating the optimized
power allocation coefficients in order to minimize the secrecy
outage probability of the system and also the ergodic secrecy
rates of the users is a subject of our future works.
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